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1 Introduction
The Commission for Africa envisages that
development assistance must be doubled if
MillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs) are to be
met. To bridge the short to medium-term gap in
financing (the difference between doubled aid and
current donor commitments), it is proposed that
the International Finance Facility (IFF) will use the
value of long-termdonor commitments to the IFF
to raise large sums in the short tomedium-term by
issuing bonds on international capital markets. By
bringing forward the value of long-term donor
commitments, the IFF will enable a critical mass
of aid to be invested in the short-term (“front-
loading”), while leaving current donor commitments
unaffected.The IFF will seek to use existing effective
bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to disburse
funds raised through the Facility and will ensure
that disbursements reflect donor’s preferred delivery
channels.
For Uganda, the prospect of doubling aid
through donor’s preferred delivery channels conflicts
with a number of our strategic objectives in our
revised Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP).
The PEAP is Uganda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper (PRSP). The strategic objectives that conflict
with increased aid are:
● Fiscal deficit reduction, private sector/export-
led growth and reduced aid dependency.
● Improvements in efficiency/value-for-money of
public expenditure and closer alignment to PEAP
priorities.
● External debt sustainability.
2 Fiscal deficit reduction, private
sector/export-led growth and
reduced aid dependency
2.1 Fiscal deficit reduction, private
sector/export-led growth
Since 1997/8, Uganda’s fiscal deficit, excluding
grants, has risen substantially by increasing
expenditure (financed by donor aid) more rapidly
than the growth in domestic revenues. The
consequence of running a higher fiscal deficit, while
at the same time maintaining inflation at or below
5 per cent, has been to increase Government’s net
issuance of securities (Treasury bills and long-term
bonds) by over 500 per cent over the past five years
and to increase the Bank ofUganda’s (BOU) foreign
exchange sales by 1,000 per cent. The issuing of
securities and foreign exchange sales are the two
instruments that the BOU uses to mop up excess
liquidity from the domestic economy if it is tomeet
the inflation objective. As a result, interest rates
have become sharply higher and more volatile,
increasing the cost of private sector borrowing.
AlthoughUgandahas enjoyed a sustained period
of economic growth, this has been due largely to
improved security, the restoration ofmacroeconomic
stability, rehabilitation of existing production
facilities and removal of economic distortions
(“rebound growth”). These policy-induced
improvements in resource allocation and resource
deployment, reflected by high total factor
productivity growth, have therefore been viewed
as movements towards the production possibility
frontier rather than as an outward shift in productive
capacity. As Uganda enters its second more
challenging phase of growth, sustaining the high
growth rates of the last 15 years will require strong
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private investment to shift the production possibility
frontier outwards, which in turn requires low and
stable interest rates as a result of a reduction in the
fiscal deficit.
Further, a recent study suggests that Uganda’s
exchange rate has been overvalued since the late
1990s and attributes a considerable proportion of
this overvaluation to the behaviour of aid flows.
Since August 2003, the general trend of a
depreciating nominal Shilling (against theUSdollar)
has been abruptly reversed. By December 2004, the
Shilling had appreciated by approx. 13 per cent
against the US dollar, caused primarily by the size
of the government’s fiscal deficit, rendering the tea,
tobacco,maize and fish export sectors temporarily
unprofitable and leading to lower farmgate prices.
The damage to the export sector caused by the
appreciation and subsequent reduction in farmgate
prices has clearly illustrated that Uganda’s large aid-
financed fiscal deficit is not necessarily compatible
with the objectives of poverty reduction and strong
export-led growth, even though its purpose is to
finance expenditures aimed at poverty reduction.
While export competitiveness can be enhanced in
the long term by improving infrastructure (roads,
rail, air and electricity) financed by an increase in
donor aid, exchange rate appreciation during this
time lag could be sufficiently damaging to “kill”
export sectors before any long-termgains are realised.
Thus it is clear inUganda that ahigh fiscal deficit,
based on current aid levels, directly undermines a
number of the supporting economic conditions
required for strong private investment, export-led
growth and structural transformation. As a result,
Uganda aims gradually to reduce its fiscal deficit
over the medium and long term by prioritising
expenditure, mobilising additional domestic
resources and reducing dependence on donor aid.
In other words, substantially increasing donor aid
is not the solution to sustainable poverty reduction
in Uganda.
In terms of what I have read to date on the
Commission for Africa, the impact on
macroeconomic management has been grossly
underplayed, especially in terms ofmonetary policy
to “mop up” excess liquidity and reduce exchange
rate volatility created by higher aid inflows – and
consequently, the impact on the private sector and
export sector has been understated. For countries
contemplating an increase in donor aid, rigorous
analysis should be undertaken to project inflation,
interest rates and the nominal and real exchange
rates to understand fully how private investment,
exports, competitiveness and poverty levels are
likely to be affected.We should not pin too much
hope on increasing the import content of public
expenditure as a way to mitigate some of the
negative effects of increased aid. InUganda, a large
share of poverty-reducing expenditure is on non-
importable/non-tradable goods and services.
Programmes such as Universal Primary Education
(UPE), Primary HealthCare (PHC), theRoad Sector
Development Plan (RSDP) and the Plan for the
Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) are primarily
wage intensive, as they require the recruitment of
skilled personnel such as teachers, health workers
and extension workers. Government cannot
therefore switch its expenditures in these
programmes away from wages to imports in any
significant way, without compromising its ability
to deliver key services through these programmes.
In addition, the capital components of these
programmes involve expenditures that do not have
high import content.Classroom construction,health
centre construction, road development and road
maintenance require domestic non-tradable goods
such as cement, bricks and timber. Further, shifting
public expenditure towards imports restricts
procurement and undermines the local economy
by reducing the multiplier effect of government
expenditure.
2.2 Reduced aid dependency
Achieving a lower fiscal deficit is not the only factor
behind Uganda’s objective to reduce donor
dependency from its current level of almost 50 per
cent.High dependency on donor aid has increased
the vulnerability of the budget to a sudden cutback
in donor aid.While a temporary reduction in aid
could be absorbed through a limited rundown of
the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves, a
cutback in aid which lasted for much more than
one year would force government to make severe
budget cuts. In addition, excessive aid dependency
inevitably impinges on the sovereignty of the aid
recipient and constrains its economic and budgetary
choices, which is not consistent with the
development of a healthy and equal relationship
between aid recipients and the donors. Reducing
dependence on aid therefore is crucial for the
development of democracy and improving the
accountability of government.
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While Uganda’s position is clear on reducing
and not increasing aid dependency, dependency
will only be reduced gradually as there are
limitations to the growth in domestic revenue.1 It
would not be prudent to expect increased domestic
revenue to “fill the gap” left by donor inflows after
the initial “front-loading” of aid tapers off, as the
most likely outcome would be domestic revenue
lagging behind over-optimistic projections,
necessitating a large fiscal cutback and reduction
in key spending programmes. For countries which
decide to decrease aid dependency, it will be crucial
to align increased aid-financed expenditure with
domestic revenue performance to ensure at least
some minimum level of fiscal sustainability. For
example, countries should seriously consider
reducing aid-financed expenditure if domestic
revenue performance over the medium term falls
below expectations; otherwise budgets will become
vulnerable to cutbacks in donor aid. Clearly
incentives such as this are needed to encourage
domestic revenue mobilisation and avoid
governments “free-riding” on the generosity of
donors. In fact, Uganda’s standpoint is heavily
influenced by its own disappointing revenue
performance since 1997/8 (revenue/Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) ratio has only increased by 2 per
cent of GDP), the same period over which donor
inflows increased substantially.
3 Improvements in efficiency/
value-for-money of public
expenditure and closer alignment
to PEAP priorities
Uganda’s deficit reduction strategy inevitably limits
public expenditure growth (including donor aid),
and consequently strong emphasis is placed on the
quality rather than the quantity of expenditure,
especially for donor projects. Any further increase
in aid to Uganda would seriously impede
government’s efforts to improve efficiency/value-
for-money and increase alignment to PEAP
priorities. There are twomain strands to this issue.
3.1 Absorptive capacity
First, increasing public expenditure (whether
financed by domestic resources or donor aid) and
maintaining or improving value-for-money requires
an equal rise in absorptive capacity, within both the
public service and the domestic economy. In
Uganda, the expansion of government expenditure
in themid-1990s,mainly funded by an increase in
donor aid, undoubtedly helped to fund key
government priorities.However, growth in public
spending outstripped the implementation capacity
in the public sector and in the wider economy, with
the result that costs were driven up and the quality
of many development projects was unacceptably
poor. Capacity constraints have been particularly
acute in the roads sector, where construction costs
have risen rapidly, cost overruns are commonplace
and there are long delays before donor-funded road
projects can get off the ground. Even some of the
money being channelled into key poverty-
eradicating programmes has not been well spent,
resulting for example in poorly constructed
classrooms.
Thus even at current aid levels, Uganda cannot
effectively absorb donor inflows; a doubling of aid
would be disastrous for efforts to improve value-
for-money and would set unit costs at unsustainably
high levels. Although the Commission for Africa
has proposed recommendations for enhancing the
quality of public institutions and capacity to increase
the effectiveness of extra funds, in practice,
increasing absorptive capacity is a long-term
process. The Commission should seriously re-
examine the IFF plan to “front-load” aid in the short
term, as this allows very little time for the public
sector and economy to develop absorptive capacity.
On a practical level, theCommissionmust come
up with a robust framework for assessing the
absorptive capacity of each country, and all
stakeholders must agree on a set of indicators to
monitor value-for-money on a regular basis. This
is far from a simple task.AlthoughUganda has had
some success with tracking studies and
strengthening formal accountability, unit costs of
inputs and outputs are rarely measured, never mind
scrutinised, and even in a sector as large as roads
with substantial donor support, the sector has failed
to develop a road construction price index. Similar
to the issue of whether aid-financed expenditure
should be adjusted downwards if domestic revenue
performance is below target, there should also be
a clear agreement to scale back aid-financed
expenditure if there are clear signs of absorption
constraints.
3.2 Delivery channel of aid
Given that the IFF will ensure that disbursements
reflect donors’ preferred delivery channels – and
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project support is the preferred channel for several
donors – a large increase in aid could herald a
proliferation of costly, misaligned projects. In
Uganda, donor projects frequently comprise low
priority expenditures that are not explicit objectives
of our PEAP and havemuch higher unit costs than
general government budget expenditure, including
budget support. The counterpart funding and
recurrent cost implications of such projects have
to bemet through the government budget and often
crowd out essential spending in priority areas. A
prime example is the roads sector where an
imbalance between capital projects and operational
expenditures has led to severe underfunding of
essential road maintenance.
To ensure better alignment of projects with
development priorities, as well as to strengthen
sector budgeting, Uganda has started to integrate
project aid into medium-term sector expenditure
ceilings. All sector expenditure ceilings are
determined on the basis of allocating a centrally
determined budget resource envelope for aggregate
government expenditures, including donor projects,
according to the government’s strategic spending
priorities, which reflect PEAP priorities.This means
that sector expenditure ceilings are determined
independently of the resources, which any donors
propose to give to a sector, whether through project
aid or sector budget support. In the event that the
sector takes on donor-funded projects greater than
the value of these projects in its sector expenditure
ceiling, its government budget ceiling will be cut
accordingly tomaintain the integrity of the overall
expenditure ceiling.2
All of this makes it inevitable that an increase in
donor projects financed by the proposed increases
in aid would cause Uganda to turn down projects
that are either not aligned with key priorities or are
too costly within the sector’s predetermined ceiling.
For example, to accommodate the Global Funds
programme within Uganda’s health sector ceiling,
the programme has been rationalised to ensure
additionality by identifying gaps in services rather
than by duplicating existing services.
4 External debt sustainability
The IFF is also likely to herald not just increased
support for projects, but also an increase in loans
to developing countries, since loans are the preferred
delivery channel of aid for major donors such as
theWorldBank and theAfricanDevelopment Bank.3
This poses a serious challenge tomany developing
countries as external debt management remains
weak in terms of coordination between external
debt contraction and development priorities and
external debt sustainability strategies.
In response to our external debt burden reaching
unsustainable levels despite enhanced heavily
indebted poor countries (HIPC) relief, Uganda has
placed a cap on all new borrowings and will limit
loans to only those that contribute directly to
productive enhancement. Therefore Uganda will
in future reject not just project aid, but loans that
either do not contribute to productive enhancement
or exceed the borrowing cap.
Uganda is concerned by the Commission for
Africa’s proposal for debt relief, 100 per cent debt
service cancellation to 2015, as this could lead to
public expenditure reaching unsustainable levels
by 2015 when the resumption of external debt
service will be felt as a “fiscal shock” leading to
expenditure cutbacks. The Commission should
focus more on immediately cancelling a proportion
of the outstanding debt of debtor countries, allowing
countries to service external debt at lower levels
and maintain fiscal stability.
5 Summary and the way forward
Although poverty levels are still high in Uganda
and government remains firmly committed to
reducing poverty and meeting MDG targets as
quickly as possible, substantially increasing donor
aid is not the way to achieve these goals in a
sustainable manner.
To recap, current aid levels inUganda are already
directly undermining a number of the supporting
economic conditions required for strong private
investment and export-led growth. Increasing the
import content of aid-financed expenditure is not
a viable option. The expansion of aid-financed
public expenditure has outstripped absorptive
capacity in the public sector and the wider economy
and, together with a proliferation of donor projects,
unit costs have been driven up resulting in poor
value-for-money andmany of the projects have not
been aligned to specific development priorities.
(For this reason, the Commission for Africa must
rethink “front-loading”). Further, despiteHIPC and
enhanced HIPC relief, Uganda’s external debt
burdenhas again become unsustainable.The revised
PEAP sets out how Uganda intends to improve
capacity within the public service – a long-term
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Notes
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author.
They do not in any way reflect the views of theMinistry
of Finance, Planning and Economic Development,
Uganda or of the Government of Uganda.
1. The constraints to revenue generation in Uganda are
structural (large informal sector), institutional
(administrative capacity) and political.
2. The integration of project aid withinUganda’s Medium-
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) is expected to
bring the following benefits: (1)Externally funded projects
will be made subject to a hard budget constraint and
normal budgetary controls will be imposed upon them.
This process will enhance budget discipline, as line
ministries will not be able to circumvent budget ceilings
by lobbying donors for project aid instead of budget
support. (2) Given the hard budget constraint imposed
by the sector ceiling, the integration of projects will
encourage ministries and agencies within each sector to
compete for expenditure demands when accepting a
donor-funded project, which gives them an incentive to
ensure that the accepted projects are in line with the
sector’s spending priorities. (3)The integration of projects
will encourage donors and lineministries to shift within
the sector fromproject aid to budget support in line with
Government’s desired policy.
3. Although theCommission supports an increase in grant
finance to limit the build-up of additional external debt.
process involving pay reform and capacity-building
at both central and local government levels.Uganda
is trying to rationalise public sector structures and
make use of existing administrative structures.
Therefore the creation of additional public agencies
is not the path Uganda will take to increasing
capacity.
To confront our challenges, Uganda aims
gradually to reduce its fiscal deficit over themedium
and long terms by prioritising expenditure on those
activities that contribute directly to poverty
eradication (i.e. focusing on quality rather than
quantity of expenditure), mobilising additional
domestic resources, and reducing dependence on
donor aid.Uganda believes that this is the optimal
strategy to reduce poverty sustainably and tomeet
MDG targets.Thus it is up toUganda to decide how
much aid it should receive and not the donors.
Given that Uganda does not expect to escape
aid-dependency quickly as there are limitations to
the growth in domestic revenue, themajor challenge
in terms of development aid is to improve the quality
of current levels of aid-financed expenditure. In
order to improve effectiveness of aid by increasing
alignment to development priorities and increasing
efficiency, Uganda’s preferred modality of aid is
budget support grants, as they directly fund
government’s expenditure priorities, as guided by
the PEAP – and further, do not contribute to
Uganda’s external debt burden. Uganda’s policy
therefore is to encourage donors to shift to budget
support, particularly budget support grants, and
to be more selective about the projects it accepts
through the integration of project aid intomedium-
term sector expenditure ceilings. However, this
does not mean that Uganda would rapidly expand
aid-financed public expenditure if increased aid all
came in the form of budget support grants, as this
would not be consistent with our deficit reduction
strategy. Rather, government savings with the Bank
ofUganda would increase and this amount would
be drawn down in future years to finance resource
shortfalls.
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